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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN MICHIGAN AND 
MASSACHUSETTS: TWO STATES WITH TWO 
DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS TO THE SAME PROBLEM 
Diane K. Danielson* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine returning home from work one evening only to find that 
the densely wooded area bordering your property has been cleared 
to accommodate a commercial strip mall. These woods were a natural 
habitat for many different species of wildlife, as well as an asset to 
your property. Through the thin veil of trees remaining just beyond 
your property line, you can see the bulldozers necessary to clear the 
land for future parking lots and building sites. Much of the wildlife 
has fled and the destruction of the woods, or at least the appearance 
of a large number of new residents, likely will drive out the rest. 
Outraged by the destruction and convinced that the project's adverse 
impact on natural resources is contrary to public policy and poten-
tially in violation of state environmental law, you join with your 
neighbors in filing a grievance with the appropriate state agency. 
The agency responds with a decision not to require the commercial 
developer to submit a report on the environmental impact of the 
project. You feel that this agency decision is incorrect and possibly 
arbitrary, but what can you do? 
If you live in Michigan, you could bring suit against the developer 
and perhaps force a compromise or obtain a temporary, if not a 
permanent, injunction. If you reside in Massachusetts, however, 
there are no more options beyond the final agency determination. 
Under Massachusetts law, if the developer follows the appropriate 
administrative procedures, courts will not review the impact of the 
impending development. Moreover, in Massachusetts, a citizen can-
not challenge the administrative decision not to require a developer 
• Topics Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
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to submit an environmental impact report. In short, administrative 
agencies have the sole discretion to resolve many of Massachusetts' 
environmental conflicts. 
In contrast to the Massachusetts system, Michigan's environmen-
tal policy attempts to encourage more effective environmental reg-
ulation by agencies through citizen and judicial intervention. In 1970, 
Michigan enacted the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (the 
Sax Act),1 the first environmental policy of its kind.2 The Sax Act 
allows citizens to bypass administrative agencies and sue directly 
any project proponents and developers, public or private, whose 
conduct significantly causes damage to natural resources.3 The act 
has served as the model for environmental policy acts in Connecti-
cut,4 Florida,5 Indiana,6 Minnesota,7 New Jersey,8 South Dakota,9 
and arguably Massachusetts.lO Each of these statutes contains a 
citizen suit provision similar to that in the Sax Act. 11 
Massachusetts enacted its environmental citizen suit statute (CSS) 
in 1971. 12 This statute, like Michigan'S Sax Act, grants citizens the 
right to sue project proponents who cause significant damage to the 
environment. 13 Massachusetts' statute, however, differs from Mich-
igan's because in order to have standing, Massachusetts plaintiffs 
cannot simply allege that defendants' conduct is damaging to the 
environment. Instead they must demonstrate that defendants' con-
1 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528(201)-(207) (Callaghan 1989). Because both Massachusetts and 
Michigan refer to their Environmental Policies as MEP A, this Comment will refer to Michi-
gan's Environmental Protection Act as the "Sax Act", after Joseph L. Sax, the professor at 
the University of Michigan Law School who was responsible for drafting the original act. 
2 Daniel K. Slone, The Michigan Environmental Protection Act: Bringing Citizen-Initiated 
Suits into the 1980's, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 271, 271 (1985). 
3 MICH. STAT_ ANN. §§ 14.528(202)(1). 
4 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (West 1985). 
5 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 1986). 
6 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to -6 (Burns 1990). 
7 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01 to -.13 (West 1987). 
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-1 to -15 (West 1987). 
9 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-lOA-1 to -15 (1986). 
10 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (West 1989); see also Jeffrey K. Haynes, Michigan's 
Environmental Protection Act in its Sixth Year: Substantive Environmental Law from Cit-
izen Suits, 53 J. OF URB. L. 589, 591, n.7 (1976); Slone, supra note 2, at 272, n.7. 
11 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-16 ("the attorney general ... any person ... 
or other legal entity may maintain an action . . . for declaratory and equitable relief against 
the state, . . . any person . . . or other legal entity for the protection for the public trust in 
the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment 
or destruction. "). 
12 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (West 1989) (amending MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 214, § lOA (1971». 
13 See infra note 110. 
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duct violates one of the state's environmental laws. 14 This require-
ment limits the applicability of the CSS because as long as developers 
in Massachusetts stay within the confines of established procedural 
and prohibitory environmental regulations, they are immunized from 
citizen suits. 15 In Michigan, on the other hand, plaintiffs merely need 
to demonstrate that defendants' conduct allegedly causes, or is likely 
to cause, significant damage to the state's natural resources, regard-
less of whether or not it violates any existing environmental law. 16 
In 1972, Massachusetts supplemented its CSS with the Massachu-
setts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).17 MEPA contains a set of 
procedural guidelines for administrative review of the environmental 
impact of proposed projects within the Commonwealth. IS It requires 
certain developers to submit environmental impact reports (EIRs) 
to the Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs 
for review and approval. 19 Since MEPA's enactment, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has interpreted the act as restricting 
the courts' jurisdiction to review certain environmental cases and 
controversies brought by citizens.2o Instead of supplementing exist-
ing environmental law, MEPA in effect has supplanted the citizen 
suit statute by creating an administrative system that emphasizes 
reliance on regulatory agencies. 
This Comment discusses these two very different approaches to 
environmental regulation-Michigan's reliance on citizen and judicial 
intervention and Massachusetts' emphasis on administrative regu-
lation. Section II presents an overview of Michigan's Sax Act, a 
statute that encourages citizen intervention in environmental con-
troversies without imposing an abundance of procedural require-
ments. 21 This section also focuses on the Michigan courts' develop-
ment of standards for environmental regulation and the strict 
limitations they place on the applicability of the Sax Act. 22 Section 
III of this Comment discusses Massachusetts' regulatory procedure 
for resolving environmental disputes: a procedure that tends to dis-
courage citizen intervention by favoring stricter procedural and reg-
14 [d. 
15 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A. 
16 See infra notes 30, 48. 
17 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (West 1988). 
18 See infra notes 121-53 and accompanying text. 
19 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62A. 
20 See infra notes 178-89 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 43-57 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 75-106 and accompanying text. 
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ulatory agency requirements.23 In this section, the Comment specif-
ically addresses the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 1988 
decision in Cummings v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envi-
ronmental Affairs, which restricted the courts' power to review 
certain administrative determinations.24 This section also discusses 
recent proposals for amendments to MEPA.25 These proposed 
amendments indicate that the Massachusetts courts may have gone 
too far in their interpretation of MEPA by completely abdicating 
their duty to protect the environmental interests of the citizens of 
Massachusetts. Section IV of this Comment compares the directions 
taken by the Michigan and Massachusetts courts by analyzing the 
judicial restrictions that have developed to limit the applicability of 
the Sax Act and MEP A. Section V of this Comment concludes that 
an efficient and less costly environmental regulation program needs 
more checks and balances between the judiciary and the administra-
tive agencies than presently exists in Michigan and Massachusetts. 
In Michigan, the court-established restrictions are perhaps too lim-
ited to make the Sax Act an effective tool for environmental regu-
lation. In Massachusetts, the citizens need easier access to the courts 
in order to fully participate in environmental regulation. In sum, 
both Michigan and Massachusetts have adapted innovative and am-
bitious environmental legislation, but the court systems have limited 
their applicability. Instead of constricting the application of the Sax 
Act and MEP A, the courts should further expand and clearly define 
the natural resources that these environmental acts serve to protect. 
II. MICHIGAN'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT 
(THE SAX ACT) 
We are a peculiar people. Though committed to the idea of a democ-
racy, as private citizens we have withdrawn from the governmental 
process and sent in our place a surrogate to implement the public 
interest. This substitute-the administrative agency-stands between 
the people and those whose daily business is the devouring of natural 
environments for private gain. 
Joseph L. Sax26 
23 See infra notes 121--53 and accompanying text. 
24 Cummings v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 524 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 
1988); see infra notes 178-99 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 200-19 and accompanying text. 
26 JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION, 
xvii (1971). 
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A. The Constitutional Duty of the Michigan Legislature to 
Protect Natural Resources 
Michigan's state constitution reflects the state's history of great 
concern for its natural resources. 27 A 1963 constitutional provision 
places on the state legislature a duty to provide for the protection 
of the environment from pollution, impairment and destruction.28 In 
1970, Michigan responded to this environmental responsibility by 
enacting the Sax Act. 29 The Sax Act is an innovative approach to 
environmental regulation that rejects agency involvement and in-
corporates the use of citizen suits to protect Michigan's natural 
resources.30 Under the Sax Act, any citizen of Michigan can sue any 
public or private project proponent for the protection of the air, 
water, and other natural resources.31 Remedies under the act, how-
ever, are limited to equitable or declaratory relief. 32 The Sax Act 
operates through the state courts which interpret the act and give 
it substance, thereby fulfilling the legislature's constitutional duty 
to protect the state's natural resources. 33 
In the 1974 case, Michigan State Highway Commission v. Van-
derkloot, the appellants accused the legislature of not fulfilling their 
'Z1 See Fred R. Jensen, Developing the Future of Michigan Environmental Law: Expanding 
and Blending MEPA with the Public Trust Doctrine, 1989 DET. C.L. REV. 65, 71 (detailing 
Michigan's incorporation of public trust doctrine from Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787 
into Michigan's constitution). 
28 MICH. CONST. of 1963 art. IV, § 52. Section 52 provides that 
[d. 
[t]he conservation and the development of the natural resources of the state are 
hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, 
safety and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the pro-
tection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, 
impairment and destruction. 
29 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528(201)-(207) (Callaghan 1989). 
30 [d. § 14.528(202)(1). The statute states in relevant part 
[t]he attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or 
agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action 
in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is 
likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political 
subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political 
subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization 
or other legal entity for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources 
and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
31 [d. 
32 [d. 
33 Jensen, supra note 27, at 76. 
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environmental duty as outlined in the Michigan Constitution.34 The 
Vanderkloots challenged the constitutionality of the statutory au-
thority under which the Highway Commission had seized eleven 
acres of their land. 35 They argued that the Highway Commission Act 
did not specifically provide for the protection of the environment. 36 
The court rejected this claim on the grounds that the legislature had 
adequately fulfilled its duty to provide environmental protection 
through its enactment of the Sax Act.37 According to the court, the 
Michigan Constitution did not require that the legislature place an 
environmental protection clause in each and every statute. 38 Instead, 
the legislature intended the Sax Act to supplement all existing state 
laws such as the Highway Commission Act. 39 
The Vanderkloot court further noted that the Sax Act provided 
more than a separate procedural route for the protection of the 
environment. 4o They interpreted the Sax Act as also providing a 
source of supplementary law, prescribing substantive rights, duties 
and functions for all persons subject to the act.41 On this basis, the 
court held that the Sax Act supplemented the Highway Commission 
Act and adequately fulfilled Michigan's constitutional duty to protect 
its natural resources. 42 
B. The Sax Act: a Radical Departure from Traditional 
Environmental Regulation 
Growing distrust of then-present administrative procedures and 
the inadequacies of the regulatory agencies responsible for environ-
34 Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d 416,419 (Mich. 1974); see 
supra note 28. 
35 Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d at 419. 
36 [d. at 424. 
37 [d. at 425. 
38 See id. 
39 [d. at 430; see MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(206) (Callaghan 1989) ("Sec. 6. This act shall 
be supplementary to existing administrative and regulatory procedures provided by law."). 
40 Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d at 427. 
4\ [d. at 428. The court supports its holding that the Sax Act incorporates both substantive 
rights and procedural causes of action through the text of the act and its official title. The 
long title for the Sax Act states that it is 
[aln Act to provide for actions for declaratory and equitable relief for protection of 
the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein; to prescribe 
the rights, duties and functions of the attorney general, any political subdivision of 
the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision 
thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other 
legal entity; and to provide for judicial proceedings relative thereto. 
[d. (quoting MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(201» (emphasis added). 
42 Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d at 428. 
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mental protection motivated the adoption of the Sax Act.43 In re-
sponse to the disgruntled public sentiment, Michigan enacted the 
Sax Act deliberately devoid of elaborate administrative procedures 
and guidelines, assigning the task of creating environmental stan-
dards to the courts.44 The legislature removed environmental quality 
control from the regulatory agencies and placed it with the citizens 
and the courts, hoping to curb the courts' general tendency in en-
vironmental cases to defer to agency expertise. 45 As cases and con-
troversies arise under the Sax Act, it is the courts that determine 
the validity and enforceability of applicable agency standards. 46 If a 
court finds that an agency standard is deficient, the court can create 
its own appropriate standard of review. 47 
Standing under the Sax Act does not depend on the existence of 
an environmental harm that personally affects the plaintiff.48 Any 
party may have standing if it alleges that a defendant's conduct 
43 See David P. Gionfriddo, Sealing Pandora's Box: Judicial Doctrines Restricting Public 
Trust Citizen Environmental Suits, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 439, 444 (1986). 
44 See John A. Watts, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act: Political Background, 4 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 358, 358 (1970). 
45 Joseph L. Sax & Roger L. Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A 
Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1972); see also Ray v. Mason .County Drain 
Comm'n, 224 N.W.2d 883,887 (Mich. 1975). The reason for this dramatic change in environ-
mental law enforcement is that "[nJot every public agency proved to be diligent and dedicated 
defenders of the environment." Id. 
46 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202)(2). This statute states in relevant part 
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (1) where there is involved a standard 
for pollution or for an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed by rule or otherwise, 
by an instrumentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, the 
court may: 
(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the standard. 
(b) When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption of a standard 
approved and specified by the court. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
47Id. 
48 See id. § 14.528(203)(1). The statute states in relevant part 
Sec. 3. (1) When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima facie showing that the 
conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water 
or other natural resources or the public trust therein, the defendant may rebut the 
prima facie showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant 
may also show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent 
alternative to defendant's conduct and that such conduct is consistent with the 
promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of the state's paramount 
concern for the protection of its natural resources from pollution, impairment or 
destruction. Except as to the affirmative defense, the principles of burden of proof 
and weight of the evidence generally applicable in civil actions in the circuit courts 
shall apply to actions brought under this act. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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adversely affects the state's natural resources. 49 Therefore, the bur-
den of proof rests on plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by 
demonstrating the occurrence or likely occurrence of an environ-
mental harm resulting from the defendant's conduct. 50 Once a plain-
tiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant may rebut the 
plaintiff's charges by submitting evidence to the contrary, or by 
showing that no realistic alternative exists to its proposed action and 
that such action will not sUbstantially harm public health, safety, or 
welfare. 51 
Although Michigan has an administrative process for reviewing 
projects potentially damaging to the environment,52 the Sax Act 
allows a citizen to file a complaint against the harmful conduct of a 
project proponent without exhausting all administrative agency pro-
cedures. 53 The legislature incorporated this bypass of the state's 
regulatory agencies in order to push the agencies to fulfill their 
environmental responsibilities to the public. 54 Supporters of the Sax 
Act believed that the threat of court involvement would result in 
better compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental legisla-
tion by regulatory agencies as well as private developers. 55 In ad-
dition, the judicial forum can better accommodate those controver-
sies that necessitate immediate attention because the act allows 
courts to hand down temporary injunctions prior to deciding the 
merits of a case. 56 Even after granting a temporary injunction, the 
49Id. 
5IJ Id. 
5! See id. 
62 See DEBORAH H. JESSUP, GUIDE To STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 293 (2d ed. 
1990). The Natural Resources Commission is the administrative agency in Michigan respon-
sible for determining long-term environmental policy objectives and hearing appeals pertaining 
to permit approval and denial. Id. 
63 See Sax & Conner, supra note 45, at 1019; see also West Michigan Envtl. Action Council, 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 275 N.W.2d 538, 541-42 (Mich. 1979) cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 941 (1979) (holding that Sax Act did not require plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative 
remedies before filing court action). 
54 See Sax & Conner, supra note 45, at 1019. 
55 See Joseph H. Thibodeau, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Panacea or 
Pandora's Box, 48 J. OF URB. LAW, 579, 597-98 (1970-71) (quoting Governor William Milli-
ken's statement in press release, from Mar. 31, 1970: "[The Sax Act] will also, in some cases, 
produce quicker action from those agencies and instrumentalities of state and local govern-
ments whose responsibility it is to protect the environment, as well as from the polluters 
themselves. "). 
56 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528 (204)(1). This section states that "[t]he court may grant 
temporary and permanent equitable relief or may impose conditions on the defendant that are 
required to protect the air, water and other natural resources or the public trust therein from 
pollution, impairment or destruction." Id. 
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Sax Act directs courts to proceed directly and quickly to the merits 
of a case without wasting time on procedural issues. 57 
The original proposal for the Sax Act created much controversy 
in Michigan.58 State manufacturers and regulatory agencies made up 
most of the opposition to the Sax Act. 59 Manufacturers, however, 
tended to let the agencies take the offensive because they feared 
publicly opposing popular environmental legislation. 60 The regula-
tory agencies opposed to the Sax Act attempted to circumvent the 
statute's liberal application by proposing amendments ensuring that 
plaintiffs exhaust all administrative procedures before taking court 
action. 61 The legislature never adopted the agencies' proposals and 
consequently enacted the Sax Act without any such limitations. 62 
C. The Public Trust Doctrine and the Role of the Courts 
Michigan specifically incorporates its historic public trusteeship 
over natural resources into the text of the Sax Act by providing 
citizens with standing to sue defendants "for the protection of the 
air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust 
therein. "63 The public trust doctrine derives from old common law 
principles that Michigan's natural resources are held in a trust for 
the benefit of the citizens of Michigan. 64 The entire state, therefore, 
has the obligation to protect the trust for the intended beneficiaries, 
the state's citizens. 65 Despite the explicit mention of the public trust 
in the Sax Act, the Michigan courts have neglected to expand and 
combine the public trust doctrine with the Sax Act. 66 
Without specifically addressing the public trust, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan discussed the idea of a communal duty in its 
examination of the parameters of the Sax Act in Ray v. Mason 
County Drain Commission. 67 In Ray, landowners and interested 
parties in the Black Creek Watershed area in Mason County sought 
57 Sax & Conner, supra note 45, at 1020; see also Jensen, supra note 27, at 76-77. 
58 Watts, supra note 44, at 360-68. 
59Id. at 364-65 (two agencies most concerned with adoption of Sax Act were Water Re-
sources Committee and Air Pollution Control Commission). 
60 Id. 
61 I d. at 365-66. 
62 I d. at 366. 
63 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202)(1); see supra note 28; Gionfriddo, supra note 43, at 443. 
64 Gionfriddo, supra note 43, at 441; see also Jensen, supra note 27, at 71. 
65 See Jensen, supra note 27, at 71. 
66 Id. at 73-74. Jensen argues that such a combination would beneficially expand the courts' 
interpretation of the parameters of the Sax Act. Id. at 81. 
67 Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'n, 224 N. W.2d 883, 888 (Mich. 1975). 
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an injunction against a local flood control program's channelization 
of drains. 68 The plaintiffs alleged that the proposed project would 
disrupt the area's swamps and woodlands which served as refuge 
for a variety of wildlife. 69 The Ray court stated that in addition to 
providing a procedural cause of action and a substantive environ-
mental right to citizens, as established in Vanderkloot,70 the Sax Act 
also imposes a duty on all individuals and organizations to prevent 
environmental damage that could result from their activities.71 The 
Ray court, however, failed explicitly to incorporate the public trust 
in its opinion. 72 Only in the 1983 case of Stevens v. Creek, did a court 
discuss the inclusion of the public trust in the Sax Act. 73 The discus-
sion in Stevens, however, was limited to the finding that the Sax Act 
did not apply only to publicly-held resources. 74 
D. The Role oJ the Courts Under the Sax Act 
In Ray, the Supreme Court of Michigan also discussed the courts' 
responsibility under the Sax Act.75 According to the Ray court, the 
legislature purposely did not create an elaborate set of procedures 
detailing every conceivable environmental impact. 76 Instead, the leg-
islature left Michigan's environmental policy open to allow the courts 
to interpret the Sax Act and to create their own standards of re-
view. 77 The legislature reasoned that these court-created standards 
arise out of actual controversies, and provide flexibility in the future 
to accommodate presently unforeseeable forms of environmental 
damage. 78 
The Ray court held that the Sax Act requires that circuit judges 
make detailed findings of fact and law in order to fulfill their envi-
ronmental responsibility.79 The court concluded that detailed findings 
68 [d. at 884. The channelization plan, requested by two local farmers to protect their crops 
from flooding, involved widening, deepening, and straightening the present drain channels. 
[d. 
69 [d. at 885. 
70 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
71 Ray, 224 N.W.2d at 888. 
72 See id. 
73 Stevens v. Creek, 328 N.W.2d 672, 674-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
74 [d. at 674; see also Jensen, supra note 27, at 87. 
76 Ray, 224 N.W.2d at 888-89. 
76 [d. at 888. 
77 [d. 
78 [d. 
79 [d. at 888-89. The court stated that 
[t]he judicial development of a common law of environmental quality, as envisioned 
by the Legislature, can only take place if Circuit Court judges take care to set out 
with specificity the factual findings upon which they base their ultimate 
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of fact in the lower courts are essential to the creation of a common 
law of environmental quality.80 Due to the minimal finding of facts 
supplied by the trial court in the Ray case, the Supreme Court of 
Michigan ultimately remanded the case back to the trial court for 
proper findings of fact. 81 
In West Michigan Environmental Action Council v. Natural Re-
sources Commission, the Supreme Court of Michigan established 
that the Sax Act required courts not to defer to agency standards 
and determinations in environmental litigation. 82 In West Michigan, 
an environmental group brought an action to restrain the state from 
issuing any permits to oil companies for oil or gas drilling in Pigeon 
River Country State Forest.83 The West Michigan court found for 
the plaintiffs and held that the trial court had erred in deferring to 
the Department of Natural Resources's conclusion that the drilling 
would not cause any impairment of the environment.84 The Supreme 
Court of Michigan reasoned that the trial court's deference to agency 
expertise violated the Sax Act, which requires independent de novo 
determinations by the courtS.85 The Sax Act does allow a court to 
remit parts of a case to agencies if administrative licensing or other 
proceedings are required or available. 86 Final determination of en-
vironmental issues, however, remains with the courtS.87 According 
to the West Michigan court, the Sax Act necessitated strict scrutiny 
of administrative agencies in order to accomplish its goal of efficient 
[d. 
conclusions. . . . In the final analysis the very efficacy of the [Sax Act] will turn on 
how well Circuit Court judges meet their responsibility for giving vitality and mean-
ing to the act through detailed findings of fact. 
80 [d. at 889; see Haynes, supra note 10, at 600. 
81 Ray, 224 N. W.2d at 892 (supreme court could not decide case on basis of three-sentence 
finding of facts and conclusion of law submitted by trial court). 
82 West Michigan Envtl. Action Council, Inc. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 275 N.W.2d 
538, 541 (Mich. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979). 
83 [d. at 540. 
84 [d. at 541. The plaintiffs challenged the Natural Resources Committee because it approved 
the plan after the submission of an environmental report from the Department of Natural 
Resources. The Department of Natural Resources originally sold the land to the oil companies 
and subsequently developed the plan for issuance of permits. [d. at 540. 
85 [d. at 541; see MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202)(2), supra note 46. 
86 West Michigan, 275 N.W.2d at 541-42; see MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(204)(2), which 
states in relevant part 
(2) If administrative, licensing or other proceedings are required or available to 
determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court may remit the parties to 
such proceedings .... In so remitting the court shall retain jurisdiction of the action 
pending completion thereof for the purpose of determining whether adequate protec-
tion from pollution, impairment or destruction has been afforded. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
87 [d. 
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environmental regulation.88 Thus, the adoption of the Sax Act chan-
neled environmental regulation away from the government agencies 
and into the Michigan court system, and the courts were now re-
sponsible for the quality of environmental standards. 
E. Common Law Development of Environmental Standards 
Under the Sax Act 
After the clarification of their duties under the Sax Act, the Mich-
igan courts began to formulate standards of review for actionable 
environmental damage. The West Michigan court began the review 
process by weighing the effects of the adverse impact on natural 
resources against the need for the conduct likely to cause the im-
pact. 89 In West Michigan, the court granted a permanent injunction 
because the plaintiffs demonstrated that the proposed drilling for oil 
and gas would have a significant adverse impact on a unique natural 
resource. 90 The court acknowledged that all human activities can 
adversely impact the environment, but concluded that not all levels 
of impact are sufficiently significant to warrant court action. 91 Be-
cause the plaintiffs in West Michigan demonstrated that oil or gas 
drilling in the area would destroy the only sizable elk herd east of 
the Mississippi River, the court found that the impact on the elk 
herd constituted impairment and destruction of a natural resource 
and granted a permanent injunction. 92 This was the first indication 
that the courts would limit the Sax Act to the protection of unique 
or rare natural resources. 
In the 1982 case, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Association v. 
Dion, the plaintiffs brought a Sax Act suit against a developer who 
planned to construct single-family homes on land that supported 
various types of wildlife. 93 The Michigan Court of Appeals denied 
the injunction, reasoning that the impact of the construction did not 
rise to a level justifying an injunction. 94 The Kimberly Hills court 
examined the issue, first raised in West Michigan, of when an en-
88 See West Michigan, 275 N.W.2d at 542. 
89Id. at 545. 
00 Id. 
9! Id. "We recognize that virtually all human activities can be found to adversely impact 
natural resources in some way or other. The real question before us is when does such impact 
rise to the level of impairment or destruction?" Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 320 N.W.2d 668, 669-70 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982). 
94 Id. at 669-70. 
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vironmental impact rises to the level of actionable impairment and 
destruction of the environment. 95 The court consequently devised a 
two-part test in which it must determine first whether the defen-
dant's activity adversely impacted a natural resource and second 
whether the activity's adverse impact rises to a level justifying 
injunctive relief. 96 The court ultimately held that the Kimberly Hills 
case involved natural resources, but that the alleged impact on those 
resources did not warrant an injunction. 97 The court based this con-
clusion on the evidence provided, which did not demonstrate that 
any of the endangered wildlife were unique or uncommon in the 
area. 98 
In a later case, City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Road Com-
mission, the Court of Appeals developed more specific standards for 
determining the level of environmental impact. 99 In City of Portage, 
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from removing certain 
trees along Portage Road in Portage, Michigan.1°O Using the two-
part test it created in Kimberly Hills, the Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the removal of trees involved a natural resource but that 
this particular tree-cutting did not rise to a level of impairment and 
destruction justifying an injunction. 101 The City of Portage court 
further supplemented the Kimberly Hills test by supplying the fol-
lowing list of factors for a court's consideration: whether the natural 
resource involved is rare, unique, or endangered, or has historical 
significance;102 whether the resource is easily replaceable;l03 whether 
the proposed action will have any significant consequential effect on 
other natural resources;104 and whether the direct or consequential 
impact on animals or vegetation will affect a critical number consid-
ering the nature and location of the wildlife affected. 105 This list of 
95 [d. at 670-71. 
96 See id. at 671; see aLso Stevens v. Creek, 328 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) 
(case remanded for plaintiff to submit evidence regarding second part of Kimberly Hills test). 
97 See Kimberly Hills, 320 N.W.2d at 674. 
98 See id. 
99 City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Road Comm'n, 355 N. W.2d 913, 915-16 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1984), Lv. denied, 422 Mich. 883 (1985). 
100 [d. at 914. 
101 [d. at 916. 
102 [d.; see West Michigan Envtl. Action Council, Inc. v. Natural Resources Comm'n., 275 
N.W.2d 538, 545 (Mich. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979) (uniqueness of elk herd was 
vital factor in decision). 
103 City of Portage, 355 N.W.2d at 915-16. 
104 [d.; see West Michigan, 275 N.W.2d at 545 (oil or gas drilling would significantly affect 
wildlife in area). 
106 City of Portage, 355 N.W.2d at 916; see, e.g., Kent County Road Comm'n v. Hunting, 
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factors, created fifteen years after the Sax Act's adoption, consti-
tutes the Michigan courts' attempt to qualify when the Sax Act 
requires their intervention in an environmental controversy. In es-
sence, the factors serve as a balancing test in which the court must 
weigh the rarity of a resource against the magnitude of the environ-
mental harm to it. 106 
III. MASSACHUSETTS' ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACTS 
A. The Massachusetts Citizen Suit Statute 
In 1971, Massachusetts enacted its own citizen suit statute 
(CSS).107 The CSS grants standing to any group of ten citizens to 
sue for an injunction against a defendant whose conduct is presently 
causing damage to the environment or likely to cause damage in the 
near future. 108 Although the CSS resembles Michigan's Sax Act in 
its use of citizen suits to protect the state's natural resources, the 
Massachusetts statute has stricter threshold requirements for plain-
tiffs bringing suit and more explicitly stated limitations on its appli-
cability.109 The CSS, unlike the Sax Act, requires that the alleged 
damage to the environment be both significant and in violation of an 
environmental statute, ordinance, by-law, or regulation. 110 The CSS 
428 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (court used factors to determine that removal of 
100 year-old trees did not constitute actionable impact); Rush v. Sterner, 373 N.W.2d 183, 
187 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (court used factors to determine that destruction of trout population 
in one river did not constitute actionable impact). 
106 Jensen, supra note 27, at 80. 
107 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § lOA (amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, 
§ 7A). 
108 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A. The CSS defines "damage to the environment" 
as "destruction, damage or impairment, actual or probable to any of the natural resources of 
the commonwealth." [d. 
109 See Gregor 1. McGregor, Private Enforcement of Environmental Law: An Analysis of 
the Massachusetts Citizen Suit Statute, 1 ENVTL. AFFAIRS 606, 608 (1971). 
110 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A. The CSS states in relevant part 
Damage to the environment shall not include any insignificant destruction, damage 
or impairment to such natural resources . ... 
The superior court for the county in which damage to the environment is occurring 
or is about to occur may, upon a civil action in which equitable or declaratory relief 
is sought in which not less than ten persons domiciled within the Commonwealth are 
joined as plaintiffs, or upon such an action by any political subdivision of the Com-
monwealth, determine whether such damage is occurring or is about to occur and 
may, before the final determination of the action, restrain the person causing or about 
to cause such damage; provided, however, that the damage caused or about to be 
caused by such person constitutes a violation of a statute, ordinance, by-law or 
regulation the major purpose of which is to prevent or minimize damage to the 
environment. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
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further requires that plaintiffs, at least twenty-one days prior to 
filing a complaint, give written notice to the agency responsible for 
enforcement of the law allegedly violated, as well as to defendants. III 
A defendant may rebut the plaintiffs' challenge by demonstrating 
that its conduct complies with either an approved regulatory pollu-
tion abatement schedule or that they are presently implementing a 
plan to alleviate the environmental damage at issue. 112 If the defen-
dant demonstrates its compliance with such a schedule or plan, the 
plaintiffs can prevail only by proving that the defendant's conduct 
still endangers public health and safety.ll3 Under the CSS, a court 
may assess court costs but may not award attorneys' fees or dam-
ages. 114 
In 1974, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) of Massachusetts es-
tablished the parameters of the CSS's applicability in City of Boston 
v. Massachusetts Port Authority. 115 The City of Boston controversy 
arose from the construction of a new passenger terminal and parking 
garage at the General Edward Lawrence Logan International Air-
port. 116 The plaintiffs based their standing on the allegation that the 
Massachusetts Port Authority had violated certain environmental 
procedural regulations. 117 Because the plaintiffs did not allege a sub-
stantive violation of an environmental statute, the SJC addressed 
the issue of whether the CSS granted standing not only for substan-
tive damage to the environment but also for failure to follow envi-
ronmental regulatory procedures. 118 In its majority opinion, the SJC 
incorporated dictum from an earlier case in which i~ had suggested 
that violations of the Hatch Act, a purely procedural statute, could 
grant plaintiffs standing and courts jurisdiction under the CSS.119 
111 Id. 
112 I d. The CSS states in relevant part 
Id. 
It shall be a defense to any action taken pursuant to this section that the defendant 
is subject to, and in compliance in good faith with, a judicially enforceable adminis-
trative pollution abatement schedule or implementation plan the purpose of which is 
alleviation of damage to the environment complained of, unless the plaintiffs dem-




115 City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 308 N.E.2d 488,493-95 (Mass. 1974). 
116 I d. at 491. 
117 I d. (standing under CSS requires that plaintiffs allege that defendant's conduct violates 
an environmental statute, ordinance, by-law, or regulation); see supra note 110. 
118 City oj Boston, 308 N.E.2d at 493-94. 
119Id. at 494-95, n.1O. In ChristoJJels v. Alton Properties, Inc., a group often Tewksbury 
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Following this line of reasoning, the City of Boston court held that 
the CSS applies to cases when a defendant either causes actual 
damage to the environment or fails to follow the correct environ-
mental regulatory procedure. 120 
B. The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) 
In 1972, one year after the adoption of the CSS, the Massachusetts 
legislature enacted MEPA, an act relying on administrative regula-
tion for environmental protection. 121 Massachusetts adopted MEPA 
to ensure that no state agency could undertake a major state project 
within the commonwealth without considering the potential environ-
mental impacts and providing an opportunity for public debate on 
these impacts. l22 Like the National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA),I23 MEPA requires public project proponents to submit en-
vironmental impact reports to an appointed agency for approval 
before commencing proposed projects.l24 Under the original 1972 
MEP A, the state agencies administering permits for these public 
projects were also responsible for reviewing the related environ-
mental report. l25 The legislature redrafted parts of MEP A in 1977 
to create a more centrally administered system under the direct 
control of the Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental 
Affairs (the Secretary).I26 Under the new MEPA, the Secretary 
heads up a MEPA Unit and reviews all environmental impact reports 
residents sought an injunction against a developer who planned to fill Ames Pond and construct 
a shopping center on the site. Christoffels v. Alton Properties, Inc., 285 N.E.2d 453, 453 
(Mass. 1972). The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, an act that 
detailed regulations and procedures for filling ponds. Id.; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
131, § 40. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Hatch Act because it did not 
provide them with an opportunity to be heard prior to departmental approval of the developer's 
pian, nor did it require departmental consideration of recommendations that could be filed 
after a public hearing. Christofiels, 285 N.E.2d at 454. The Christo!fels court rejected the 
plaintiffs' claim because the Hatch Act does not confer any enforceable rights on the plaintiffs. 
Id. The Court noted, however, that the Hatch Act did not preclude the plaintiffs from 
proceeding under the newly enacted CSS. Id. 
120 City of Boston, 308 N.E.2d at 494-95. 
121 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (West 1988). 
122 GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE, H.R. Doc. No. 5859 (1971). 
123 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347. 
124 See Thomas F. Holt & Franklin G. Stearns, A Survey of Recent Environmental Decisions 
in Massachusetts and the First Circuit, 75 MASS. LAW R. 103, 110 (1990) (NEPA requires 
environmental impact study prior to federal actions that significantly affect environment); see 
also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62A. 
125 See H.R. Doc. No. 5134 (1972) (prior to 1977, project proponents submitted EIRs to 
separate agencies for approval). 
126 1977 Mass. Acts 947, § 1 (Secretary will review all economic impact reports). 
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(EIRs), therefore separating the permitting process from the envi-
ronmental review. 127 These 1977 amendments also expanded MEP A's 
jurisdiction beyond the regulation of public projects to incorporate 
parts of the private development sector. 128 
MEP A now authorizes the Secretary to regulate all public and 
many private construction projects in Massachusetts. 129 The act es-
tablishes a series of procedural steps that a project proponent must 
complete before beginning construction. 130 MEP A applies to all state 
agencies and any private developers applying for state-issued per-
mits or public funding. 131 The Act's primary requirement is an EIR, 
which any public or private project proponent subject to MEPA 
must submit to the Secretary. 132 An EIR informs project proponents, 
appropriate government agencies, and the general public about both 
the environmental effects of the proposed development and possible 
alternatives. 133 MEPA requires extensive EIRs for all public projects 
and any publicly funded private projects, but only requires limited 
EIRs for privately funded projects requiring state-issued permits. 134 
127 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301 § 11.02. A MEPA Unit is the Secretary's staff responsible 
for the implementation and administration of the MEPA review process. Id. 
128 1977 Mass. Acts 947, § 1; see Jonathan C. Kaledin, The Massachusetts Environmental 
Policy Act and Private Development Activity: Is the Law Working? 32 BOSTON B.J., 23, 23 
(1988). 
129 See Steven C. Davis, Common Wealth, 5 ENVTL. F., 10, 10 (1988). 
130 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § § 61-62H. Section 61 requires all state agencies 
and departments involved in projects to assess and minimize the damage to the environment. 
Id. at § 61. Section 62 defines the important terms included in MEPA. Id. at § 62. Section 
62A sets out the timetable for initial submission and review, and describes the subject matter 
jurisdiction of privately funded projects. Id. at § 62A. Section 62B lists the required contents 
of an EIR. Id. at § 62B. Section 62C sets out the timetable for review by the Secretary and 
deadlines. Id. at § 62C. Section 62D states the deadlines for acting on permit applications. 
Id. at § 62D. Section 62E gives the Secretary the power to create categories of projects and 
permits not requiring EIRs. Id. at § 62E. Section 62F allows projects to begin before final 
approval, if emergency action by a person or agency is essential to avoid or eliminate a threat 
to public health or safety, or a threat to any natural resources. Id. at § 62F. Section 62G 
allows federal EIRs to be submitted in lieu of state reports. Id. at § 62G. Section 62H sets 
deadlines for filing a suit under MEPA. Id. at § 62H. See also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, 
§§ 11.00-11.30 (1987) (MEPA regulations promulgated by Secretary). 
131 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 62A, 62B (only private developers receiving 
public funds or requiring state-issued permits are subject to MEPA review); MASS. REGS. 
CODE tit. 301, § 11.01(1). 
132 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62A; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301 §§ 11.02, 11.07. 
133 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30,§ 62B; see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301 § 11.07 
(outline and content of EIR). 
134 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30 § 62A. An EIR is limited for privately funded 
projects only to those aspects of the project for which a state-issued permit is necessary. Id. 
The statute states that "[iJn the case of a permit application to an agency from a private 
person for a project for which financial assistance is not sought the scope of said report and 
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Pursuant to MEP A, the Secretary promulgates regulations which 
create thresholds, procedures, and timetables for a two-level review 
process. 135 The first level involves an Environmental Notification 
Form (ENF) review. 136 If a project meets certain threshold require-
ments regarding type and size, as detailed in the regulations, the 
project's developer must submit an ENF to the MEPA Unit. 137 The 
Secretary publishes notice of each ENF review in the Environmen-
tal Monitor, a state journal. 138 This publication initiates a thirty-day 
ENF review period at the end of which the Secretary determines 
whether the project requires an EIR.139 During the review period, 
the Secretary accepts written comment and may hold a public con-
sultation session to review the details of the project and discuss its 
possible impacts and alternative suggestions. 140 
The second level of the MEP A review process pertains only to 
those projects required to produce an EIR.l4l If the Secretary de-
termines that an EIR is required, the Secretary must issue formal 
documentation of the scope of the EIR for that project. 142 For pri-
vately funded projects requiring a state-issued permit, the scope of 
an EIR is limited to that part of the project requiring a state-issued 
permit.143 In contrast, a public project requires an EIR for every 
aspect of the project which might feasibly affect the environment. 144 
In either case, the project proponent must prepare a draft EIR and 
file it with the Secretary.145 The Environmental Monitor then an-
nounces the availability of the draft and another thirty-day public 
alternatives considered therein shall be limited to that part of the project which is within the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the permit." [d. 
135 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62H; see MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, §§ 11.00-11.30. 
136 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, §§ 11.04-.06. 
137 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.25 is a list of 32 project types or sizes, all of which 
would require both an ENF and an EIR, provided that the project is publicly funded or is a 
privately funded project requiring an agency action or permit. [d. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 
301, § 11.26 is a list of those sorts of permits that would cause the proponent of a private 
project to file an ENF. [d. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.27 is a list of the review thresholds 
for projects requiring agency actions and financial assistance. [d. 
138 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.19. 
139Id. at § 11.05. 
14°Id. 
141 [d. at § 11.06. 
142 [d. 
143 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62A; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.06(3). For 
example, if the project needs only a sewage permit, then the ErR is limited to a study of the 
environmental effects of the proposed sewage plan. Id. 
144 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62A; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.06(3). 
145 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.07 (description of the elements required in draft 
EIR). 
1993] TWO STATES, TWO SOLUTIONS 117 
comment period commences, which the Secretary's official comments 
follow. 146 The project proponent then prepares a final EIR from these 
comments and submits it to the Secretary, who places notice of its 
availability for public review in the Environmental Monitor. 147 One 
final thirty-day period for comments follows this notice. 148 No project 
may begin until the Secretary issues a positive decision on the final 
EIR, indicating that the project may commence construction. 149 
MEPA also requires that any state agency that acts on a project 
requiring an EIR must submit its own finding of potential environ-
mental impact, generally referred to as a "Section 61" finding. 150 An 
agency's Section 61 finding assures the Secretary that the proponent 
will take all feasible means and measures to minimize the project's 
potential to cause environmental damage. 151 The Section 61 finding 
is limited to the scope of the EIR.152 Similarly, no Section 61 finding 
is required when the Secretary does not require an EIR for a proj-
ect.153 
C. Judicial Review Under the CSS and MEPA 
In contrast to the CSS which provides a judicial forum for citizens 
with environmental grievances, MEP A does not specifically provide 
for judicial review in all cases. 154 The lack of specificity has given 
rise to a controversy over the extent of court interference in envi-
ronmental regulation in Massachusetts. In the 1974 City of Boston 
case, the SJC discussed the availability of judicial review, under the 
CSS and MEPA, of those agency decisions affecting the environ-
ment. 155 The City of Boston case involved the construction of a new 
passenger terminal and parking garage at Logan International Air-
port. 156 The plaintiffs alleged that the Massachusetts Port Authority 
failed to follow correct environmental regulatory procedure. 157 Thus, 
the court first had to resolve the issue of standing under the CSS 
146 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62C; see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.08. 
147 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62C; see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.09. 
148 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62C; see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.09. 
149 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62B; see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.01(2). 
150 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30 § 61; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.10. 
151 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30 § 61; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.01. 
152 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30 § 61; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.10(3). 
153 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30 § 61; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.01(3). 
154 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30 § 61-62H. 
155 City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 308 N.E.2d 488, 503-05 (Mass. 1974). 
156 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
157 [d. 
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and MEP A,158 and then the availability of judicial review of regula-
tory decisions. 159 In the opinion, the City of Boston court relied on 
an earlier case, West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Commissioner 
of the Department of Community Affairs, involving a challenge to 
the Boston Housing Authority's operation of a housing project. 160 
The West Broadway court held that the courts should not intervene 
in administrative agencies' discretionary decisions until plaintiffs had 
exhausted all alternative regulatory procedures. 161 Like City of Bos-
ton, the West Broadway case did not involve any of the traditional 
challenges to administrative agencies, such as the constitutionality 
of a relevant statute or a charge of arbitrary and capricious decision 
making. 162 Instead, the plaintiffs asked the court to substitute its 
own judgment for that of an administrative agency.163 The West 
Broadway court noted its reluctance to scrutinize an agency action 
except in cases which involved the public's health or safety.l64 De-
spite the court's recognition that health and life were at issue in the 
West Broadway housing controversy, it held that satisfactory alter-
native administrative procedures were available and directed the 
plaintiffs to exhaust these procedures before petitioning for judicial 
review. 165 The City of Boston court relied on this reasoning and held 
that it could not intervene in the controversy because the procedures 
detailed in MEP A provide alternatives to judicial review which plain-
tiffs must exhaust before judicial intervention. 166 
In the 1975 case, Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massa-
chusetts Port Authority, the SJC reviewed another controversy over 
158 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (plaintiffs have standing under CSS if 
they allege either a procedural or substantive violation of an environmental law). 
159 City of Boston, 308 N.E.2d at 503-05. 
160 See id. at 503-04 (quoting West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of 
Community Affairs, 297 N.E.2d 505, 509-10 (Mass. 1973». 
161 West Broadway, 297 N.E.2d at 510. 
162 I d. at 509. The plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of the relevant statute, 
nor did they allege an offense of a specific statutory prohibition or charge the agency with 
arbitrary or capricious decision making or inaction. Id. In West Broadway, the SJC had to 
determine the appropriate time for judicial intervention in an administrative action that was 
neither regulatory nor adjudicatory. I d. 
163 Id. 
164 See id. at 510. 
165 See id. 
166 City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 308 N.E.2d 488, 504 (Mass. 1974). The 
City of Boston court acknowledged that, at the time of filing, the alternatives detailed in 
section 62 had yet to become effective. Id. Nevertheless, the court stated that it must interpret 
sections 61 and 62 together for them to accord with the legislature's intent. Id. Therefore, 
plaintiffs must first follow section 62 procedure before bringing a court action. Id. 
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construction at Logan International Airport.167 In the Secretary of 
Environmental Affairs case, the Secretary challenged the authori-
ty's determination that it did not need to submit an EIR for re-
view. l68 The SJC upheld the superior court's finding that it had 
jurisdiction for judicial review of an agency decision not to submit 
an EIR.169 The Secretary of Environmental Affairs court distin-
guished the City of Boston holding, which did not allow judicial 
review, on the basis that the plaintiffs in the present case had 
exhausted all agency alternatives, and therefore, judicial review was 
appropriate. 170 
The next important case regarding the availability of judicial re-
view under MEP A did not occur until 1985 when the Boston Pre-
servation Alliance challenged the Secretary's decision to limit the 
scope of an EIR for the International Place project in Boston's 
financial district.17l In Boston Preservation Alliance, Inc. v. Secre-
tary oftke Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, the plaintiffs 
alleged that MEPA required the Secretary to order a full-scope EIR 
covering all environmental impacts, including wind, shadow, visual, 
historical, and archaeological effects. 172 Because the project involved 
a private developer, the Secretary ordered an EIR limited to poten-
tial sewage and traffic impacts, the two areas of the project requiring 
state permits. 173 
The SJC rejected the plaintiffs' arguments for a full-scope EIR on 
the grounds that MEPA had limited subject matter jurisdiction for 
167 Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 323 N.E.2d 329, 
340 (Mass. 1973). 
168 [d. at 331. 
169 [d. at 344. 
170 [d. at 340. The Secretary of Environmental Affairs court also discussed the involvement 
of public health and safety and the appropriate court response, as referred to in West Broad-
way. [d.; West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Community Affairs, 297 
N.E.2d 505, 510 (Mass. 1973); see supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. The court held 
that public health and safety were important in the Secretary of Environmental Affairs case, 
and that because of this the courts had a responsibility to scrutinize the agency decision. 
Secretary of Environmental Affairs, 323 N.E.2d at 340. The legislature enacted MEPA 
because agencies, such as the authority, had not given sufficient consideration to environmental 
concerns. See id. The SJC held that "[c]onsequently, when an agency makes a decision 
downplaying the environmental effects of a proposed activity, the court may properly 'cock a 
skeptical eye' at that decision." [d. The court also referred to federal cases where the courts 
exercised their power of de novo review of negative agency statements. [d. at 341, n.6. 
171 Boston Preservation Alliance, Inc. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 
487 N.E.2d 197, 198 (Mass. 1986). 
172 [d. at 199. 
173 [d. at 200. 
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EIRs involving private development.174 Based on the legislature's 
granting to the Secretary the authority to promulgate rules and 
regulations for MEPA, the SJC reasoned that the legislature in-
tended for the Secretary to have broad discretion in establishing the 
parameters of its authority.175 Allowing the Secretary this discre-
tionary power, however, did not mean that the courts were to ab-
dicate their duty to review agency decisions that are allegedly ar-
bitrary and unreasonable. 176 The SJC stated that despite the broad 
discretionary power of the Secretary, they would not hesitate to 
overrule the arbitrary or unreasonable agency interpretation of stat-
utes or rules. 177 
In 1988, the SJC distanced themselves from environmental regu-
lation by abruptly restricting its jurisdiction to review certain ad-
ministrative determinations in Cummings v. Secretary of the Exec-
utive Office of Environmental Affairs. 178 In Cummings, ten 
residents of Gloucester, Massachusetts sued the Secretary, alleging 
that the Secretary's decision not to require an EIR for a mixed-use 
commercial development in Gloucester violated MEPA.179 The cen-
tral issue before the SJC was whether the Massachusetts superior 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action challenging a 
Secretary's decision not to require an EIR.180 Despite finding juris-
diction to review the scope of an EIR in Boston Preservation Alli-
ance,181 the Cummings court definitively ruled that neither MEPA 
nor the Secretary's regulations granted the courts jurisdiction to 
review the Secretary's determination not to require an EIR.182 
After denying jurisdiction to the Superior courts under MEP A, 
the SJC then faced the issue of whether the CSS could grant the 
courts jurisdiction in a challenge to the Secretary's decision not to 
require an EIR.l83 The CSS expressly grants jurisdiction to the 
superior courts whenever a group of ten citizens seek equitable or 
174 Id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62A; see supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
175 Boston Preservation Alliance, 487 N.E.2d at 202. 
176 See id. The court noted that "[tlhis principle ... is 'one of deference, not abdication,' 
and this court will not hesitate to overrule agency interpretations of statutes or rules when 
those interpretations are arbitrary or unreasonable." Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Cummings v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Mfairs, 524 N.E.2d 836, 840 
(Mass. 1988). 
179Id. at 836...,'37 (project at issue was Gloucester Landing Association shopping mall). 
18°Id. at 837. 
181 See Boston Preservation Alliance, 487 N.E.2d at 201. 
182 Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 837. 
188 Id. at 838. 
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declaratory relief against project proponents whose conduct causes 
significant environmental damage which is in violation of an environ-
mental law. 184 In the City of Boston case, the SJC held that the CSS 
encompasses both procedural and substantive violations of environ-
mental legislation. 185 In Cummings, the court adhered to this ruling 
but denied the plaintiffs' claim against the Secretary on the basis 
that a decision not requiring an EIR is neither a procedural nor a 
substantive violation of any environmental statute, ordinance, by-
law, or regulation. l86 According to the court, an incorrect decision 
by the Secretary did not constitute damage to the environment as 
defined by the CSS.187 The SJC reasoned that the Secretary acts as 
a disinterested public official to whom deference by the courts con-
stitutes sound environmental policy based on the Secretary's exper-
tise in environmental matters. 188 The SJC has upheld the Cummings 
interpretation of the CSS and MEPA as recently as 1991.189 
In a lengthy dissent in Cummings, Justice Abrams interpreted 
MEPA to grant review of a Secretary's decision not to require an 
EIR. 190 First, Abrams noted that MEPA contains language which 
allows for review. 191 Second, the SJC has previously reviewed other 
184 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A, supra note 110. 
186 See City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 308 N.E.2d 488, 494-95 (Mass. 
1974), supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. 
186 See Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 838~9. 
187 See id. at 839. The court relied on Warren v. Hazardous West Facility Site Safety 
Council, and held that the language of the CSS suggests that "the Legislature contemplated 
only the agency or authority or private person proposing a project, and not the public official 
who administers the statutory scheme, as 'the person causing or about to cause' environmental 
damage." [d.; Warren v. Hazardous West Facility Site Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d 102, 110 
(Mass. 1984). If the plaintiffs had challenged the project proponents for failure to comply with 
the procedural requirements of a relevant provision, then the superior court would have had 
jurisdiction under the CSS. Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 838~9. The court also relied on Aertson 
v. Landrieu, a first circuit case where the court did not review the Secretary's decision not 
to require an EIR. [d.; Aertson v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D. Mass) afl'd on other 
grounds, 637 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980). 
188 Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 839. 
189 See Villages Development Co. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 571 
N.E.2d 361, 366-67 (Mass. 1991) (upholding the Cummings interpretation of CSS and MEPA, 
although specifically limiting its application to cases that challenge Secretary's determination 
not to require EIR for project). 
190 Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 842. 
191 See id. The majority held that the language in the second paragraph of section 62H, 
allowing that "[a]ny action alleging an improper determination that a project requires the 
preparation of an [EIR]" indicated the legislative intention to limit review to project propo-
nents' challenges of the requirement of an EIR. [d. (emphasis added). Abrams found such a 
reading contradictory to the language of the first paragraph of section 62H, in which the 
legislature allows actions "whether a project requires the preparation of an [EIR]" [d. (em-
phasis added). 
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Secretaries' decisions, and the 1977 MEP A amendments do not re-
veal any legislative intent to limit review in this particular area. 192 
According to Justice Abrams, legislative silence on an issue is not 
indicative of radical departures from existing law. 193 
Justice Abrams also argued that the plaintiffs fulfilled the CSS's 
standing requirements, thereby granting the superior court proper 
jurisdiction over the case. 194 The plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary 
made an incorrect decision not to require an EIR.195 Under MEPA, 
any project that may cause damage to the environment requires an 
EIR.196 Abrams argued that an incorrect determination by the Sec-
retary not requiring an EIR could constitute significant damage to 
the environment and therefore violate MEP A.197 In addition, the 
plaintiffs alleged that a possible abuse of discretion or an arbitrary 
decision by the Secretary is in itself an error of law and a violation 
of MEPA.198 Thus, Justice Abrams concluded that because an incor-
rect decision by the Secretary could cause significant damage, and 
that an arbitrary decision violates environmental law, the plaintiffs 
reasonably had standing under the CSS.199 
In sum, the SJC's decision in Cummings restricts the courts' role 
in environmental regulation, and consequently limits the public's 
access to the courts. The decision also grants extensive unchecked 
power to the Secretary. This is not the result intended by the leg-
islature and one which they are attempting to correct. 
D. The Legislative Response to Cummings 
In response to the Cummings decision, both the Massachusetts 
legislature and the Secretary have proposed several amendments to 
Justice Abrams also argued that because section 62H allows actions to commence within 
the thirty days following the first issuance of a permit or grant of financial assistance, it is 
possible that the party bringing an action is a party challenging the Secretary's decision not 
to require an EIR. [d. The party receiving the permit would have no reason to further 
challenge the Secretary's determination. [d. 
192 [d. at 842-43. 
193 [d. at 843. 
194 [d. at 844; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A, supra note 110 (only limitations 
on standing under the CSS are that alleged damage must be significant and in violation of an 
environmental law). 
195 Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 836-837. 
196 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 62C. 
197 Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 844. 
198 [d.; see Boston Preservation Alliance, Inc. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. 
Affairs, 487 N.E.2d 197, 202 (Mass. 1986) (SJC will not hesitate to overrule arbitrary and 
unreasonable agency interpretations); see supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
199 Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 844. 
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MEPA, the first of which appeared in July 1988, only one month 
after the Cummings decision. 200 The most recent proposal is pres-
ently in third reading in the Massachusetts House of Representatives 
and will likely be engrossed and sent to the Massachusetts Senate 
in the Fall of 1992.201 This proposal amends several basic areas of 
MEPA, but most notably it counteracts the SJC's ruling in Cum-
mings, which limits review of the Secretary's EIR determinations. 202 
Specifically, the amendments seek to: provide for judicial review of 
the Secretary's decisions not to require an EIR; give the Attorney 
General the authority to obtain injunctive relief and civil penalties 
for violations ofMEPA; allow local cities and towns to request review 
of projects that would normally not meet MEPA's threshold require-
ments; and clarify the time for bringing an action before the courtS.203 
The proposed amendments received both positive and negative 
endorsements from interested parties. 204 Regardless of the position 
taken, however, most submitted opinions have openly supported the 
provision explicitly granting citizens the right to judicial review of 
a Secretary's decision not to require an EIR.205 The provision limits 
the judicial review to whether the Secretary exceeded his or her 
statutory authority, whether the decision was arbitrary or capri-
cious, or based upon an error of law, and whether the Secretary 
200 H.R. Doc. No. 6131 (1988) (on file with the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and 
Agriculture). 
201 Conversation with Neil O'Brien, Staff Director, Joint Committee on Natural Resources 
and Agriculture, July 16, 1992. 
202 H.R. Doc. No. 4549 (1992) (on file with the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and 
Agriculture). The same bill has been proposed in the Senate. S. Doc. No. 915 (1992) (on file 
with the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture). 
203 H.R. Doc. No. 4549 (1992). 
204 See, e.g., Judy Shope for The Environmental Lobby of Massachusetts, In Support of 
H6131, An Act to Improve the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), Address 
before the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture (Nov. 15, 1988) (transcript 
available at the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture); Marsha Rockefeller, 
for the Massachusetts Audubon Society, In Favor of H. 6131, An act to Improve the Massa-
chusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), Address before the Joint Committee on Natural 
Resources and Agriculture (Nov. 15, 1988) (transcript available at the Joint Committee on 
Natural Resources and Agriculture); letter from James A. Aloisis, Jr., Assistant Secretary 
for Governmental Affairs for the Executive Office of Transportation and Construction, to 
Representative Steven Angelo, House Chair, Joint Committee on Natural Resources and 
Agriculture, (Nov. 14, 1988) (on file with the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and 
Agriculture); letter from David Begelfer, President; National Association of Industry and 
Office Parks (NAIOP), to Representative Steven Angelo (Nov. 15, 1988) (on file with the 
Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture). 
205 See, e.g., letter from Richard A. Nylen, Jr., NAIOP, to Representative Steven Angelo 
(Apr. 11, 1991) (on file with the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture) 
(stating that, "N AIOP is not opposed to extending standing to legally challenge the Secretary's 
decisions pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 62-62H."). 
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abused his or her discretion. 206 In addition to explicitly providing for 
judicial review, this provision clarifies who may bring such actions 
by authorizing persons proposing the project, cities or towns, ag-
grieved individuals, and groups of ten or more residents to challenge 
the Secretary's decisions in superior court.207 This provision is con-
sistent with the previously adopted CSS which allows concerned 
citizens to bring environmental challenges in court. 208 
Another generally uncontested MEP A amendment proposal would 
explicitly prohibit projects from commencing until the Secretary 
determines that a project does not require an EIR.209 Under present 
law, a private developer may begin construction before or during 
the MEP A review period on any part of a project not within MEP A's 
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, construction can begin on a project 
and then be held up for years, or permanently, due to a subsequent 
EIR that reveals the possibility of severe environmental damage. 210 
The proposed amendment, however, provides that the Secretary 
may still opt to allow commencement of a project if such commence-
ment does not foreclose mitigation options and does not lead to the 
potential for significant environmental damage. 211 Although there 
has been some opposition to the inclusion of such a "loophole" in this 
particular provision, this amendment is generally supported.212 
206 H.R. Doc. No. 4549 (1992). 
207 [d. 
208 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214 § 7A, supra note 110. 
209 See H.R. Doc. No. 4549, § 1 (1992), which states that 
[d. 
[nlo agency shall commence a project ... or act on a permit, land transfer, or financial 
assistance application for any such project unless the secretary has determined that 
no environmental impact report is required .... No private person seeking a permit, 
land transfer, or financial assistance from an agency for a project ... shall commence 
that project unless the secretary has determined that no environmental impact report 
is required, .... 
210 See, e.g., Phillip J. Nexon, The Aftermath of Christmas Tree Plaza: Could a "New" 
MEPA Directly Restrict Private Development?, Mass. Continuing Legal Educ. Conference 1 
(1990). For example, an inadequate EIR submittal delayed the Christmas Tree Plaza retail 
development project in Hyannis for almost a year. [d. "The project was virtually completed-
and the store shelves actually stocked-before the Final Environmental Impact Report was 
approved and before two curb cut permits (the only required state permits) were obtained." 
[d. 
211 H.R. Doc. No. 4549, § 2 (1992). The provision states that "[nlo agency shall commence 
a project ... unless the secretary has made a written finding that such commencement does 
not foreclose mitigation options and does not lead to the potential for significant environmental 
damage." [d. 
212 Darshan Brach & Rebecca Marks, Comments of Conservation Law Foundation on Senate 
Bill 915 Amending the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, April 16, 1992, at 6 (on file 
with the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture). Brach and Marks suggest 
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The provision which allows the Attorney General to obtain in-
junctive relief reinforces the legislative need for fully informed de-
cision making prior to commencement of building activity.213 N ever-
theless, the amendment only provides the Attorney General with 
this power and some of its supporters do not find it adequate. 214 The 
Conservation Law Foundation suggests an expansion of this provi-
sion allowing ten citizens or aggrieved persons to obtain injunctive 
relief. 215 They also suggest that the amendment provide for the 
recovery of attorneys' fees which would make access to the courts 
easier for the public. 216 The Conservation Law Foundation reasons 
that most citizens, as evidenced in the Cummings case, are less 
interested in seeing fines and penalties assessed, and more interested 
in preventing environmental damage. 217 
The proposal's remaining provisions expand the categorical limi-
tation of projects reviewed, and clarifies the time period for bringing 
a court action. One proposed amendment provides cities and towns 
with an opportunity to request a review of those projects requiring 
city permits, but which do not automatically trigger review under 
the MEP A regulations. 218 This provision would provide small towns 
and cities with more control over private developments in their 
region. The provision clarifying the time period for bringing court 
action is an effort to remedy procedural difficulties before a case can 
even reach the superior court level. This will potentially limit the 
that such a loophole would be detrimental to MEPA's effectiveness and cite Sierra Club v. 
Marsh, a federal case where the court noted that "[t]he way that harm arises may well have 
to do with the psychology of decision makers, and perhaps a more deeply rooted human 
psychological instinct not to tear down projects once they are built. But the risk implied by a 
violation of NEPA is that real environmental harm will occur through inadequate foresight 
and deliberation." Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 504 (lst Cir. 1989)). 
Another loophole that is not addressed by the proposed amendments allows developers to 
circumvent the delay of the review period through the waiver provision of the regulations. 
See Mass. Regs. Code tit. 301, § 11.18 (1987). The regulations give the Secretary the discretion 
to waive any provision or requirement if the Secretary finds that strict compliance with such 
provision or requirement would result in an undue hardship and would not serve to minimize 
or avoid damage to the environment. See id. This waiver, however, has ultimately become a 
bargaining device for both the Secretary and project proponents. See Kaledin, supra note 
128, at 25 (stating that "a disconcerting trend has emerged: because of the subject matter 
jurisdiction limitation built into MEPA, in situations where the [Secretary] recognizes the 
need for a comprehensive ErR but cannot legally require such a study, the waiver mechanism 
is being used as a bargaining device."). 
213 H.R. Doc. No. 4549 (1992). 




218 H.R. Doc. No. 4549, § 5 (1992). 
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number of future cases and help the courts move beyond procedural 
issues and focus on the merits of these environmental challenges. 
In short, proposals exist in the legislature which could remedy the 
inadequacies of MEP A.219 The adoption of the proposed amendments 
would overrule Cummings and subsequent cases, increase the use 
of the CSS as an effective tool for environmental regulation, and 
restore the balance of power between the administration and the 
citizens by way of judicial review. 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF Two DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICIES AND THE COURT-IMPOSED RESTRAINTS ON THEIR 
ApPLICABILITY 
A. The Sax Act: An Innovative Statute, Restricted by the 
Michigan Courts 
Michigan's Sax Act limits agency control over environmental reg-
ulation by permitting plaintiffs to initiate court actions whether or 
not they have exhausted relevant administrative procedures.22o Op-
ponents of the Sax Act feared that because of the freedom given to 
citizens to bring suits, the statute's enactment would flood the Mich-
igan courts with frivolous cases.221 Moreover, the Sax Act does not 
contain a minimum threshold of environmental impairment.222 The-
oretically, the statute allows a plaintiff to take to court any party 
whose conduct is causing even insignificant environmental damage. 223 
Nevertheless, frivolous citizen suits have not flooded the courts since 
the adoption of the Sax Act.224 Some scholars attribute the limited 
number of Sax Act suits to the lackluster state of the economy. 225 
The economic recession in the decade following the statute's enact-
ment slowed residential construction projects, which are a main 
source of Sax Act litigation.226 Another impediment to plaintiffs is 
219 See id.; S. Doc. No. 915 (1992). 
220 See supra note 53. 
221 Robert H. Abrams, Thresholds of Harm in Environmental Litigation: The Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act as Model of a Minimal Requirement, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 
107, 118 (1983); see also Thibodeau, supra note 55, at 597. 
222 Abrams, supra note 221, at 112. 
223 See id. 
224 See Sax & Conner, supra note 45, at 1007; see also Slone, supra note 2, at 272; Haynes, 
supra note 10, at 593 (in six years following enactment, only 119 cases of 600,000 filed in 
Michigan courts were filed under Sax Act.). 
225 Haynes, supra note 10, at 593. 
226 [d. 
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the unavailability of money damages in Sax Act suits. 227 Many plain-
tiffs cannot afford to bring a suit unless they have a vital interest at 
stake. 228 
Sax Act opponents also feared that the environmental groups that 
had pushed heavily for the statute's enactment would step in and 
file numerous suits throughout the state. 229 This fear has gone un-
founded as environmental organizations have not used the Sax Act 
with the amount of zeal originally expected.230 
In spite its lack of specific common law standards, the Sax Act 
has proved effective in encouraging settlements. 231 Because the 
courts have interpreted the Sax Act to require a low threshold for 
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of significant environmental 
damage, parties have opted to settle rather than incur the expense 
of litigation. 232 
Those groups initially opposed to the Sax Act felt that allowing 
courts to develop environmental standards on a case-by-case method 
would lead to confusion over substantive issues such as what would 
constitute significant damage to the environment. 233 Until the courts 
specifically addressed the lack of a threshold for standing in 1985, 
there were no limitations for bringing a Sax Act suit during the first 
fifteen years of the act's existence. 234 Not until the City of Portage 
case did a Michigan court delineate the factors necessary for deter-
mining whether or not a particular project's threatened impairment 
to the environment is actionable. 235 The City of Portage factors were 
227 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528. The title to the Sax Act states that this is "An Act to 
provide for actions for declaratory and equitable relief for protection of the air, water and 
other natural resources .... " [d. (emphasis added). 
228 Slone, supra note 2, at 273-74, 315. The community focus of the Sax Act has meant that 
plaintiffs showing interest in suits far from home is minimal. [d. 
229 Sax & Conner, supra note 45, at 1008. 
230 See id. (despite original efforts to enact Sax Act, environmental groups have not used 
the statute with any frequency); see also Haynes, supra note 10, at 594 (environmental groups 
have made only modest use of statute). 
231 See Slone, supra note 2, at 29l. 
232 See id. at 291, 300 (Sax Act also encourages mitigating alternatives); see also Joseph L. 
Sax & Joseph F. DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the 
Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 51 (1974). Through studies done 
during the first few years following the enactment of the Sax Act, Sax and DiMento determined 
that if a trial ensues, a plaintiff must anticipate litigation expenses averaging around $10,000, 
but if the case settles without a trial, costs averaged just under $2,000. This data is from 
information collected from questionnaires sent to plaintiffs and defendants involved in Sax 
Act cases. [d. 
233 See Thibodeau, supra note 55, at 597. 
234 See Abrams, supra note 221, at 113. 
235 See City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Road Comm'n, 355 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Mich. 
App. 1984), Iv. denied, 422 Mich. 883 (1985); see supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. 
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an attempt to deter future Sax Act plaintiffs from bringing numerous 
small-scale suits.236 Similar to the Massachusetts courts' interpreta-
tion of the CSS and MEPA, the City of Portage court interpreted 
the Sax Act in a manner that restricted the original intent of the 
statute.237 By limiting the Sax Act to the protection of uncommon or 
unique natural resources, the City of Portage opinion limited the 
act's applicability and effectiveness in environmental regulation. 238 
In sum, the Sax Act is a broadly-drafted statute dependent upon 
the courts for the creation of environmental standards and guide-
lines.239 In fulfilling their responsibility, the courts have subsequently 
interpreted the Sax Act so that it only protects uncommon or unique 
natural resources. 240 One scholar has suggested that the courts ex-
pand their restrictive interpretation of the Sax Act to include the 
common law idea of the public trust.241 The act specifically provides 
for the protection of the air, water, other natural resources, or the 
public trust therein. 242 The public trust does not protect only uncom-
mon or unique resources. 243 The Sax Act's drafters included the 
protection of the public trust in order to make the Sax Act more 
comprehensive in its applicability.244 Thus, the Michigan courts could 
easily use this doctrine to expand the protection of the Sax Act to a 
number of natural resources.245 Short of overruling the City of Por-
tage case, this may be a necessary step that the courts must take in 
order to make the Sax Act an effective system of environmental 
regulation in Michigan. 
B. The Massachusetts Cummings Case: A Restrictive 
Interpretation of the CSS and MEPA 
Like the Michigan courts which imposed restrictions on the appli-
cability of the Sax Act, the Massachusetts SJC imposed its own 
236 See Gionfriddo, supra note 43, at 468-75. Gionfriddo argues that Kimberly Hills is a 
"bad case that made bad law." [d. at 468. He believes that the Kimberly Hills holding and 
the cases following, like City of Portage, artificially restrict the courts from extending the 
Sax Act to reach beyond the protection of unique natural resources. [d. at 469-70. 
287 See Jensen, supra note 27, at SO. 
238 [d. 
289 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
240 See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. 
241 See Jensen, supra note 27, at 81-83. 
242 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202)(1), supra note 30. 
243 See Jensen, supra note 27, at 71-72. 
244 See id. at 85. 
245 [d. at 82. 
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jurisdictional limitations in environmental regulation.246 The SJC's 
ruling in Cummings narrowed the scope of both the CSS and MEPA 
by giving the superior courts jurisdiction only when a project pro-
ponent-and not a public official responsible for administering en-
vironmental regulations-violates an environmental law. 247 The 
Cummings court specifically held that the superior courts lacked 
jurisdiction to review a challenge of a Secretary's decision not to 
require an EIR.248 Moreover, the court stated that this rule applies 
even when plaintiffs allege that the Secretary made an arbitrary or 
capricious determination. 249 
In its denial of judicial review, the Cummings court misconstrued 
the plain language of both MEP A and the CSS.250 As Justice Abrams 
explained in her Cummings dissent, MEPA's language does not 
explicitly prevent review of the Secretary's determination not to 
require an EIR. 251 In addition, Justice Abrams argued that the 
plaintiffs had fulfilled the threshold requirement of the CSS because 
an improper determination by the Secretary can result in damage 
to the environment, and therefore the court should have found stand-
ing for the plaintiffs. 252 
The Cummings majority also improperly relied on precedence 
such as Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council for 
its argument that the legislature did not intend citizens to challenge 
the official responsible for administration of the regulatory agency. 253 
The Warren case specifically stated that the CSS did not authorize 
injunctive relief against an agency created to regulate the process 
for siting hazardous waste facilities. 254 The Warren circumstances 
are distinguishable from those of the Cummings case because the 
plaintiffs in Warren challenged the feasibility determination by the 
siting agency, not the actual siting of the project.255 The feasibility 
determination is only a preliminary step in the siting process and 
246 See Cummings v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 524 N.E.2d 836, 
839-40 (Mass. 1988). 
247Id. 
248 Id. 
249 See id. at 839. 
250 See id. at 842 (J. Abrams, dissenting). The plain language of both the CSS and MEPA 
do not reveal any clear intent of the legislature to immunize the Secretary from review. I d. 
Nor do the 1977 amendments alter the plain language of MEPA to deny review. Id. 
251 See id.; see supra notes 190-99 and accompanying text. 
252 See id. at 844; see supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text. 
253 See id. at 839 (quoting Warren v. Hazardous West Facility Site Safety Council, 466 
N.E.2d 102, 110 (Mass. 1984)). 
254 See Warren, 466 N.E.2d at 110. 
255 I d. at 108. 
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the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the feasibility of a siting 
determination would likely cause damage to the environment.256 Pre-
liminary siting determinations in themselves do not damage the 
environment, nor do they indicate the likelihood of consequential 
environmental harm.257 The plaintiffs' challenge in Warren was ini-
tiated prematurely and therefore, cannot act as controlling precedent 
for the Cummings case. 258 
In addition, the Warren court stated that the CSS did not allow 
injunctive relief against an agency of the commonwealth. 259 The 
plaintiffs in both Cummings and Warren, however, did not seek to 
enjoin the Secretary from continuing harmful conduct. 260 Instead, 
the plaintiffs sought judicial review of agency determinations. 261 The 
SJC already resolved this issue in City of Boston, in which the court 
relied on its West Broadway opinion to hold that plaintiffs may obtain 
judicial review of an agency decision when they have exhausted all 
feasible administrative alternatives. 262 Thus, the Cummings court 
should not have used Warren to support the holding that the CSS 
and MEP A preclude judicial review of a Secretary's decision not to 
require an E IR. 
The Cummings court could have properly relied on other cases 
which would have yielded a result in favor of the plaintiffs. In City 
of Boston, the SJC held that the CSS grants standing to citizens 
who bring suit against defendants whose conduct violates either a 
substantive or procedural environmental regulation.263 Justice 
Abrams argued that if an incorrect decision by the Secretary results 
256 [d. at 110. 
257 [d. 
258 See supra note 187. The court's reliance on Aertson v. Landrieu, is also misplaced because 
the Aertson court only stated that the "[Secretary's] determination that no EIR is required 
is a complete answer to plaintiffs' contentions under MEPA." Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 844; 
Aertson v. Landrieu, 488 F.Supp. 314, 323 (D. Mass.), aff'd on other grounds, 637 F.2d 12 
(lst Cir. 1980). The Secretary's determination in Aertson refers to the project proponent's 
compliance with procedural requirements of MEP A, the only state law issue in the case. 
Aertson, 488 F.Supp. at 323; see Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 844 (J. Abrams dissenting). 
Additionally, a federal court decision on this issue does not bar judicial review of a Secretary's 
negative determination by the superior courts. See Cummings, 524 N.E.2d, n.9 at 844. 
259 See Warren v. Hazardous West Facility Site Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d 102, 110 (Mass. 
1984). 
260 [d. at 108. 
261 [d.; see also Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 839. The Cummings court suggests that the 
provision in the CSS that the Superior Courts may "before the final determination of the 
action, restrain the person causing or about to cause such damage" prevents the courts from 
reviewing a Secretary's decision. [d. 
262 See supra note 166. 
263 See City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 308 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Mass. 1974); 
see supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. 
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in environmental damage, that decision substantively violates 
MEPA.264 Therefore, a group of citizens could have standing under 
the CSS to challenge the Secretary's conduct. 265 To interpret the 
CSS and MEPA otherwise would mean that so long as a project 
proponent and the Secretary correctly follow procedure, a Secre-
tary's decision not to require an EIR would be unassailable regard-
less of any improper motivations or environmentally damaging re-
sults. 266 The SJC has also previously held that both the CSS and 
MEP A explicitly allow for judicial review of agency decisions. 267 The 
City of Boston court found judicial review appropriate after the 
plaintiff exhausts all administrative alternatives.268 In Boston Pre-
servation Alliance, the SJC reviewed the scope of a Secretary's 
decision to limit the content of a required EIR. 269 Thus, the court 
has authorized judicial review of administrative determinations in at 
least two instances in the past, and the Cummings ruling contradicts 
this precedence. First, pursuant to the City of Boston holding, the 
plaintiffs in Cummings exhausted their administrative alternatives 
before bringing a court action. 270 Second, a proposed project is likely 
to cause similar environmental damage regardless of whether the 
Secretary incorrectly limits the scope of an EIR, as alleged in Boston 
Preservation Alliance, or decides not to require an EIR in the first 
place. 271 Although the SJC acknowledged the logic behind the latter 
argument, they refused to act on it. 272 
264 Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 844 (J. Abrams, dissenting). 
265 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214 § 7A, supra note 110. 
266 See Seth D. Jaffe, Cummings v. Executive Office of Environmental Affairs: The SJC 
Restricts Access to the Courts in Environmental Cases, BOSTON B.J. May/June 1989, at 17. 
Jaffe notes that "unless MEPA or [the CSS] is amended, MEPA may no longer serve as a 
basis for legal challenges to development decisions, so long as the developer and the Secretary 
of EOEA comply with the procedural requirements of MEPA." Id. He bases his view on the 
SJC's statement in Cummings that there is no "specific provision in MEPA or in any other 
statute susceptible of violation by the secretary's incorrect, or even arbitrary, determination 
that an EIR is not required." Id.; Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 839. 
267 See Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 323 N.E.2d 
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In addition to ignoring precedence, the Cummings court misin-
terpreted the legislative histories of the CSS and MEP A which do 
not support its argument that the legislature intended to exempt 
the Secretary from judicial review. At the time of the CSS's enact-
ment, Governor Francis W. Sargent intended the CSS to include 
citizens in the enforcement of environmental regulation.273 Limiting 
citizen access to judicial review of environmental controversies, as 
the SJC did in Cummings, contradicts that original intention. 274 In 
addition, Governor Sargent's original proposal for MEP A in 1971 
required agencies to make well-informed decisions and held public 
officials accountable to the people. 275 He repeated this intention in 
his endorsement of the proposed MEP A amendments in 1972.276 It 
is doubtful the legislature intended to except the Secretary from this 
accountability. Thus, in 1971 and 1972, when Massachusetts first 
enacted its environmental policy acts, neither the language nor the 
history of the statutes suggested any legislative intention to limit 
either courts' jurisdiction or involvement by citizens in environmen-
tal regulation. Moreover, the 1977 MEP A amendments do not reveal 
any change in these original intentions.277 The SJC's majority opinion 
in Cummings is inapposite to the plain language and the legislative 
intent of the CSS and MEPA, as well as to prior case law. Unless 
273 GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE, H.R. Doc. No. 5023 (1971) (enJorsing CSS permitting citizens 
to join in enforcement of antipollution laws). 
274 See Cummings, 524 N.E.2d at 840. 
275 GoVERNOR'S MESSAGE, H.R. Doc. No. 5859 (1971). Governor Francis W. Sargent stated 
that MEPA's goal is to "insure that our decisions are as well informed as they can be, and 
that the people have an opportunity to know, to argue, to disagree if they must, and ultimately 
to hold us, the public officials, accountable." [d. (emphasis added). 
276 GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE, H.R. Doc. No. 5134 (1972). Governor Francis W. Sargent stated 
that "[MEPA] builds into our decision making process a major consideration in the develop-
ment of state projects; that people will be informed of all relevant factors and that we as 
public servants will be held accountable for our decisions." [d. (emphasis added). 
277 See Cummings v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Mfairs, 524 N.E.2d 
836, 842 (Mass. 1988) (J. Abrams dissenting). Justice Abrams argued that the legislature 
failed to state their intention to eliminate the courts' ability to review a Secretary's decision 
not to require an EIR. [d. The Cummings majority, however, reasoned that deference to the 
Secretary is appropriate after the 1977 MEPA amendments because of the centralization of 
the review process. [d. at 839. Prior to the amendments project proponents submitted EIRs 
to different agencies for approval; after 1977, the Secretary regulates the procedure and has 
expertise in this area. [d. Nevertheless, Abrams warns against allocating unchecked power 
to agencies based on their level of expertise because it leaves agencies with no practical limits 
on their discretion and pushes them toward the point of unaccountability. [d. at 846 (J. 
Abrams dissenting) (quoting Arthurs v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 418 N.E.2d 1236, 
1244 (Mass. 1981» (stating that abdication of judicial review on basis of agency expertise 
means that administrative expertise is "on its way to becoming 'a monster which rules with 
no practical limits on its discretion."'). 
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the SJC itself moves to overrule the Cummings case, the adminis-
trative decisions not to require EIRs will remain immune from re-
view. In the absence of court initiative, it will be left to the legisla-
ture to take action and restore a proper balance to environmental 
regulation in Massachusetts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Returning to the dilemma created by the construction of the com-
mercial strip mall just beyond your property line, what alternatives 
actually exist for you? In Michigan, in the instance where an admin-
istrative agency fails to adequately regulate the environmental im-
pact of a project, the Sax Act exists which grants citizens the right 
to bring a court action for equitable or declaratory relief. In truth, 
however, unless you have a rare elk herd grazing in your backyard, 
the Michigan courts will not grant injunctive relief. In Massachu-
setts, at the present time, you can be similarly estopped because of 
the courts' reluctance to review a Secretary's decision not to require 
an EIR. Thus, Michigan and Massachusetts have adopted two vastly 
different models for state environmental policies, yet due to subse-
quent court interpretations, neither provides effective assistance in 
many of the environmental controversies faced by the individual 
citizen. 
Where do you go from here? In Michigan, the legislature could 
pass an amendment clarifying whether it intended the courts to limit 
the application of the Sax Act to unique and rare natural resources. 
Moreover, the courts themselves could overrule the Court of Ap-
peals' City of Portage standards or use the public trust doctrine to 
expand the Act's applicability. In Massachusetts, the legislature is 
attempting to clarify the extent of MEP A by explicitly granting the 
courts jurisdiction to review a Secretary's determination not to re-
quire an EIR, as well as amending various other loopholes within 
the Act. Should they adopt this proposal, citizen participation in 
environmental regulation would likely increase, as would compre-
hensive, fully-informed decision making prior to the commencement 
of projects. Both Michigan and Massachusetts have instituted pro-
gressive environmental regulations, however, by leaving the respon-
sibility of interpretation to the courts, the potential effectiveness of 
the regulations have been greatly hindered. It is time for the courts 
to take on their responsibility and interpret the Sax Act, CSS, and 
MEPA to protect against a wider spectrum of environmental dam-
age, before too many natural resources become uncommon or unique. 
